Our engine does not just run predefined rules. We operate the largest and most aggressive simulation, try-and-error, and back-testing system in Web3 security. We chain attack events, replay exploit sequences, and actively hunt for new vulnerability patterns — ones that no existing tool has catalogued, no registry has named.
We find what others miss. We name it, document it, and build a detector for it — before the next protocol gets hit.
Think of us as the antivirus of smart contracts. Not just signature-matching against known threats — actively seeking the unknown, discovering new attack surfaces, and publishing our findings to protect everyone.
This is a non-stop war field. On one side: attackers trying to break into people's wallets, drain protocols, steal savings. On the other: us — Satoshi's Army. Engineers, researchers, and contributors who chose a side and showed up.
We are the last non-governmental, non-private-equity security team that works for people, by people. Our users are not a product. Our roadmap is not controlled by a board. We are here to make sure that every user, every family, every friend who touches DeFi has someone watching their six.
Vault.sol:184 — withdraw()
External call returns control before balance is decremented. Attacker re-enters recursively, draining full TVL in one transaction.
Access.sol:92 — transferOwnership()
No onlyOwner modifier. Any caller can rotate the ownership pointer and unlock all admin functions in one transaction.
Vault.sol:67 — balanceOf()
View function called mid-transaction returns pre-update state. Integrators reading this to price collateral accept inflated balances.
Rewards.sol:214 — claim()
Result of .call{value:}() discarded. Silent failure path marks the user paid while funds stay in contract.
Token.sol:148 — mint()
uint256 downcast to uint128 without bounds check. Values above 2¹²⁸ wrap silently — supply ledger is wrong.
Registry.sol:19 — register()
Recovery requires a redeploy if address(0) is registered as a permitted caller. Not exploitable alone; recovery cost is asymmetric.
Every finding ships with two human-readable companions: a plain-English explanation of what went wrong, and an auto-generated patch that resolves it. You don't need to read Solidity to ship a safer contract.
When a user withdraws, the contract sends ETH first and only then updates their balance. A malicious contract can hijack that gap — re-call withdraw() from its fallback before the balance is zeroed — and drain the entire vault in one transaction. Same family as the 2016 DAO hack.
(bool ok,) = msg.sender.call{value: amt}(""); require(ok, "transfer failed"); balances[msg.sender] -= amt; balances[msg.sender] -= amt; (bool ok,) = msg.sender.call{value: amt}(""); require(ok, "transfer failed");